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TO WHOM SHOULD WE POINT OUR STYLUS?:
ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF REVIEW IN
E-DISCOVERY OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT

I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic discovery ("e-discovery") law governs the discovery of
electronically stored information ("ESI").' By definition, e-discovery is
"the process of identifying, preserving, collecting, preparing, [processing,
searching, reviewing], and producing [ESI] in the context of the legal
process. ' ,2 One way e-discovery differs from traditional discovery is that
parties no longer must search through thousands of pages manually to locate
discoverable documents.'
The thrust of e-discovery's differences from
traditional discovery, however, is the increased costs associated with its

1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (granting permission to use ESI in discovery); FED. R. C1v.
P. 34(b)(1)(C), 34(b)(2)(B), 34(b)(2)(D)-(E) (setting forth production rules and procedures for ESI
discovery).
2 See Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-380S(F), 2013 WL 2250603, at
*5 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (quoting THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY E-DIsCOVERY
& DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 18 (3rd ed.) (citing Maum R. Grossman & Gordon V.
Cormack, The Grossman Cormack Glossary of Technology-Assisted Review, with Forewordby
John M Facciola, U.S. MagistrateJudge, 7 FED. CTS. L. REv. 1, 15 (2013)); see also Gordon v.
Kaleida Health, No. 08-CV-378S(F), 2013 WL 2250579, at *5 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013)
(citing Grossman & Cormack, supra, at 15); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 15 (Sherry B.
Harris
&
Paul
H.
McVoy
eds.,
4th
ed.
2014),
available
at
https://thesedonaconference .org/system/files/sites/sedona.civicactions.net/files/private/drupal/files
ys/publications/The%2 0 Sedona%2OConference%/o20Glossary/o20E-Discovery/o20%/2526
%20Digital%/o2Olnfonnation%/o20Management 4tho20Ed-July%/202014.pdf
(defining
"ediscovery").
3 See Jacqueline Hoelting, Note, Skin in the Game: Litigation Incentives Changingas Courts
Embrace a "Loser Pays" Rule for E-Discovery Costs, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1107 (2013)
("E-discovery is vastly different from the traditional methods of discovery, such as written
responses to requests for information or sorting through stacks of boxes filled with paper
documents.").
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review and production. 4 These costs are mainly a result of the large volumes
of data accessible in e-discovery.
Although e-discovery case law continues to grow, as Congress
anticipated, the rapid pace at which ESI evolves has created unique
challenges in the discovery stage of litigation that case law has not addressed,
especially regarding social media content. 6 Social media content createsand will constantly create-new challenges for lawyers involved in ediscovery as fresh social media applications with evolving layouts continue
to surface. 7
Social media content, like any other type of material, must be
relevant to be discoverable; the requesting party must be reasonably specific
as to the requested items. 8 Precisely, the material sought must relate to any

4 W. Benefit Solutions, L.L.C, v. Gustin, No. 1:11-CV-00099-EJL, 2012 WL 4417190, at *14
(D. Idaho Sept. 24, 2012) (citing Kevin A. Griffiths, The Expense of Uncertainty:How A Lack of
Clear E-DiscoveryStandardsPutAttorneys and Clients in Jeopardy,45 IDAHOL. REV. 441 (2009))
("E-discovery is an entirely different type of discovery from traditional paper discovery, primarily
because of the increased cost of production.").
5 See Hoelting, supra note 3, at 1107 (stating amount of information recoverable in e-discovery
is "limitless"). Sometimes, lawyers who fail to take the time to become well versed in e-discovery
rules and processing contribute to the high cost of e-discovery. Craig Ball, Are We Paying Five
Times
Too
Much
for
E-discovery?,
EDD
UPDATE
(May
2,
2010),
http://www.eddupdate.com/2010/05/are-we-paying-five-times-too-much-for-ediscovery.html.
6 See FED. R. C1v. P. 34(a) advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment ("[Rule 34(a)]
covers-either as documents or as electronically stored information information 'stored in any
medium,' to encompass future developments in computer technology. Rule 34(a)(1) is intended to
be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to
encompass future changes and developments."); see also id.advisory committee's notes to 2015
amendments (attempting to address evolving issues in e-discovery).
7 See Ilya Pozin, 15 Social Media Companies to Watch in 2015, FORBES, Dec. 17, 2014, 10:09
AM, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilyapozin/20 14/12/17/15-social-media-companies-to-watch-in2015/ (listing up and coming social media platforms). Although Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat
and Twitter are the current popular social networking websites and applications, applications with
innovative layouts-like Bubbly, which is a voice-based social media application that allows users
to record, edit, add effects to and share voice-clips-are projected to become popular or take the
place of current popular applications. Id.This projected cycle is similar to how My Space and Hi5
are no longer "in." See Adam Hartung, How Facebook Beat MySpace, FORBES, Jan. 14, 2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2011/01/14/why-facebook-beatmyspace/#46e0fd0d97023 (explaining how Facebook became the leader in social media platforms).
In addition, social media companies that are already popular are partnering with start-up companies
and are predicted to grow. Pozin, supra.
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The Rule provides, in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access
to relevant infornation, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
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claims or defenses to meet the threshold showing of relevance under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 26(b)(1).' The review of
documents is necessary to satisfy this threshold.' 0 "The objective of review
in ediscovery is to identify as many relevant documents as possible, while
reviewing as few non-relevant documents as possible.""
In order to
determine whether any content on social networking sites ("SNS")-such as
Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, or Linkedln-is relevant to a particular
case, review of the content is necessary. 12 As a result, a party must bear the
burden of review. 13 In traditional discovery, this burden is usually borne by
the producing party, but some courts have abandoned tradition when dealing

resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.
Id.; see also FED. R. Cfv. P. 34(b)(1)(A) ("The request: ... must describe with reasonable
particularity each item or category of items to be inspected."); Silva v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc.,
No. 3:14CV580(WWE)(WIG), 2015 WL 1275840, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 19, 2015) ("That the
instant motion seeks an order to compel social media communications, rather than hard copy
materials, does not take it out of the ambit of Rule 26's relevancy requirements.").
9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (setting forth general scope of federal discovery requests).
10 See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adoptedsub
nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 CIV. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (stating importance of reviewing documents to determine
discoverability).
" Id. (stating precise objective in reviewing documents with potential discoverability).
12 See id.

A social networking website is an online platform that allows users to create a public
profile and interact with other users on the website. Social networking websites usually
have a new user input a list of people with whom they share a connection and then allow
the people on the list to confirm or deny the connection. After connections are
established, the new user can search the networks of his connections to make more
connections. A social networking site may also be known as a social website or a social
networking website.
Definition
What does Social Ne/working Site (SNS) mean?, TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4956/social-networking-site-sns.
(last visited Mar. 25,
2016).
13 See inf!a Part III (highlighting different parties who may bear burden).
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with SNS or social media content. 14 The costs associated with ESI drives
the discussion about who should bear the burden of review. 15
This note will lay out the different approaches courts take in
determining who should bear the burden of review in the e-discovery of
social media, while highlighting differences in the policies behind the
approaches. 16 Identifying the party who should bear the burden of review is
important due to the increase of costs associated with e-discovery; to that
end, this note will point to remedies that could reduce the burden of review. 17
Thereafter, this note will argue that the best approach is to amend the Fed.
R. Civ. P. to include the application of a burden-shifting balancing test.18

Under the test, the review is a two-step process-courts would perform an
initial minimal in camera review, then place the burden on the producing
party-unless: (1) the requesting party can show that the producing party's
14 See Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 117 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (quoting Rozell v. Ross-Hoist, No. 05 CIV. 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006)) ("[C]ounsel for the producing party is the judge of relevance in the first
instance."); Agnieszka A. McPeak, The Facebook DigitalFootprint: PavingFairand Consistent
Pathwaysto Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 945 (2013).
The better solution is to treat social media data the same as other forms of evidence. It
is the burden of the producing party to review potentially responsive information and
determine what needs to be produced. If a dispute arises, the court may perform an in
camera review of the narrow category of information in dispute. Courts should not,
however, be put in a position to review the entire contents of a social media page. Not
only is this burdensome on the court but it may be embarrassing or unfair for the account
holder.
Id.
15 See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007)
(acknowledging "significant costs associated with discovery of ESI"); W Benefit Solutions, LLC,
2012 WL 4417190, at *4 (citing Griffiths, supra note 4, at 441) (noting "increased cost of
production" differentiates e-discovery from "traditional paper discovery"); Hoelting, supra note 3,
at 1107 (noting "ESI does not come cheap").
16 See infra Part III (noting majority view is that producing party should bear burden).
17 See, e.g., James M. Wright, Estimating the Cost Burden of E-Discovery: A New andBetter
Method, FTI CONSULTING (2008), http://pdfserver.amlaw.comAegaltechnology/EDiscBurdenEst.
WhitePaper.pdf (acknowledging an industry of technological service providers have arisen to assist
with reviewing ESI); JUDGE XAVIER RODRIGUEZ & JULIA WOMMACK MANN, ESSENTIALS OF EDISCOVERY, Chapter 12 Cost Shifting 1 (Judge Xavier Rodriguez ed., 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admiistrative/litigation/materials/2015sac/written materials/5 2 chapter 12 cost shifting.authcheckdam.pdf (highlighting reducing
costs of e-discovery is necessary due to high costs). "E-discovery has evolved into avery expensive
endeavor, spawning a cottage industry of products, technology, and vendors to search, collect, and
produce ... (ESI) ... searching through all the potential forms of ESI for relevant discoverable
information is often an expensive task that can be burdensome for both the litigant and the client."
Id.; see also infra Part III (providing one way to reduce burden is by using applicable discovery
rules).
18 See infra Part V (arguing varying methods should merge into one consistent rule).
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credibility is at issue, or (2) the producing party contests that the courtindicated responsive contents are privileged or nonresponsive after its
thorough review. 19 If a requesting party is successful at challenging the
producing party's credibility, then the court would decide how to allocate the
burden based on four balancing factors.2°

II. THE EVOLUTION OF ESI
Since 1970, Congress has endeavored to address electronic data in
discovery. 21 In that year, Congress amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) to include
electronic documents-making electronic information discoverable-as
computers and machines became increasingly popular. 22 Fed. R. Civ. P.
34(a) reads, in pertinent part:
(a) In General. A party may serve on any other party a
request within the scope of Rule 26(b):
(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its
representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following
items in the responding party's possession, custody, or
control:
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored
information-including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or
data compilations-stored in any medium from which
information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary,
after translation by the responding party into a reasonably
usable form; or
(B) any designated tangible things .... 3

Thereafter, in 2006, Congress made substantial efforts to address
cost and efficiency-at which time, the term of art, ESI, debuted.24 For
19 See infra Part V (stating in camera review can prevent or reduce disputes about what content
is relevant).
20 See infra Part V, Section C (noting courts should consider non-exhaustive list of factors
when deciding which method to use).
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment (revising
description of "documents" to include "electronic data compilations").
22 Id. (adding ESI to list of items parties may request for production).
23 See FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a)(1) (including electronic information for discovery purposes).
24 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment (amending
discovery rules vigorously to accommodate ESI); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee's
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instance, the 2006-Amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) "require[ed] that
parties need only search and produce from 'reasonably accessible' sources
of ESI, but the producing party must identify and provide information to
opposing counsel about those sources that [he or she] regards as 'not
reasonably accessible." 25 In addition, the 2006 Amendments created a right
for parties to "test or sample" and "inspect and copy" ESI material in Rule

34(a).26 Next, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(b) was amended to allow a producing
party to exclude ESI that is "not reasonably accessible due to undue burden
or costs" because locating and retrieving the ESI would prove to be
difficult.2 7 Lastly, Congress amended Rule 26(f)(2) to require counsel to
discuss e-discovery plans, such as the form in which the discovery should be
produced.28
Although Congress aggressively amended the Fed. R. Civ. P. in
2006, there were still issues with efficiency and cost that Congress needed
to address regarding ESI.29 Most recently, they amended
the rules in 2015
30
to improve efficiency and lessen e-discovery costs.
For instance, prior to the amendments, content had to "appear
reasonably calculated" to lead to discovery to be relevant, and now, content

notes to 2006 amendment; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment;
see also Julia M. Ong, Note, Another Step in the Evolution of E-Discovery: Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Yet Again?, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 404, 415 (2012)
(elucidating effects 2006 amendments had on e-discovery). See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (creating term
of art). See also, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (reflecting some amendments to 2006 rules);
FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2) (addressing issues raised by difficulties locating, retrieving, and providing
discovery of some ESI); FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (describing failure to preserve ESI).
25 Ong, supra note 24, at 415 (explaining 2006 Amended Rule 26(b)(2) thoroughly).
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment (explaining
Amendment).
27 See FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment (explaining
addition of subparagraph (B) regulates "burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored
information").
28 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f) advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment ("Early discussion
of the forms of production may facilitate the application of Rule 34(b) by allowing the parties to
determine what forms of production will meet both parties' needs. Early identification of disputes
over the forms of production may help avoid the expense and delay of searches or productions
using inappropriate forms.").
29 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (reflecting 2015 Amendments on discovery scope and limits);
FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (reflecting 2015 Amendments on protective orders for specifying terms
for disclosure and discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3) (reflecting 2015 Amendments on contents
of order); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (C) (reflecting 2015 Amendments on concept of request).
30 See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(1) (reflecting 2015 Amendments); FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c)(1)(b)
(describing recent Amendments to statute); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3) (explaining 2015 statute
Amendments); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (C) (stating changes made to statute in 2015).
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must be "relevant to any party's claim or defense." 3' Further, Congress
32
expressly granted courts the authority to shift discovery costs.
Additionally, Congress encouraged more judicial involvement in the ediscovery process as to key discovery issues, and made clear the standard for
sanctions for failure to preserve ESI. 33 Finally, Congress made a few
amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 that were "aimed at reducing the potential
to impose unreasonable burdens by objections to requests to produce."3 4
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (reflecting change in prerequisite necessary for material to be

discoverable).

32 FED. R. Civ. P.

26(c)(1)(B) (noting courts may issue an order for "the allocation of

expenses").
33 See FED. R. Cfv. P. 16(b)(3)(B) (outlining "permitted contents" of scheduling orders); FED.
R. CIr. P. 16(b)(4) (permitting modification of scheduling orders "for good cause and with the
judge's consent"); FED. R. C1v. P. 26(f) (delineating discovery-planning rules for parties and
granting courts discretion to expedite planning schedule); FED. R. Cfv. P. 34(b)(2)(E) (prescribing
production of ESI "unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court"); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)
(allowing courts to sanction parties for failing to preserve ESI). Congress previously mentioned
greater judicial involvement in the discovery process. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's
notes to 1983 amendment ("The rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in
the discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a selfregulating basis.").
34 FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. The note provides:
Rule 34(b)(2)(A) is amended to fit with new Rule 26(d)(2). The time to respond to a
Rule 34 request delivered before the parties' Rule 26(f) conference is 30 days after the
first Rule 26(f) conference.
Rule 34(b)(2)(B) is amended to require that objections to Rule 34 requests be stated with
specificity. This provision adopts the language of Rule 33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt
that less specific objections might be suitable under Rule 34. The specificity of the
objection ties to the new provision in Rule 34(b)(2)(C) directing that an objection must
state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.
An objection may state that a request is overbroad, but if the objection recognizes that
some part of the request is appropriate the objection should state the scope that is not
overbroad. Examples would be a statement that the responding party will limit the search
to documents or electronically stored information created within a given period of time
prior to the events in suit, or to specified sources. When there is such an objection, the
statement of what has been withheld can properly identify as matters "withheld"
anything beyond the scope of the search specified in the objection.
Rule 34(b)(2)(B) is further amended to reflect the common practice of producing copies
of documents or electronically stored information rather than simply permitting
inspection. The response to the request must state that copies will be produced. The
production must be completed either by the time for inspection specified in the request
orby another reasonable time specifically identified in the response. When it is necessary
to make the production in stages the response should specify the beginning and end dates
of the production.
Rule 34(b)(2)(C) is amended to provide that an objection to a Rule 34 request must state
whether anything is being withheld based on the objection. This amendment should end
the confusion that frequently arises when a producing party states several objections and
still produces information, leaving the requesting party uncertain whether any relevant
and responsive information has been withheld on the basis of the objections. The
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E-discovery case law in the context of social media is expanding.
As to general social media discovery principles, courts have made it clear
that because social media content is only discoverable if relevant to the
claims at issue, a requesting party is not automatically entitled to access a
producing party's entire account. 36
The general threshold is that
discoverability does not have to be very narrow, such as only requesting
materials directly correlated to the assertions in a complaint, but should not
be so overbroad that it may result in a fishing expedition.37 Further, an
overarching reason for issues in e-discovery of social media is that
"[r]elevance of the content.., is ... in the eye of the beholder." 38 For
producing party does not need to provide a detailed description or log of all documents
withheld, but does need to alert other parties to the fact that documents have been
withheld and thereby facilitate an informed discussion of the objection. An objection
that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials
qualifies as a statement that the materials have been "withheld."
Id.
35 See E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 430-37 (S.D. Ind. 2010)
(representing one of first cases in social media discovery); see also Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No.
3:08CV1807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1-2 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (representing one of first
cases in social media discovery).
36 See Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. at 436 (holding only relevant parts of employees'
social account was discoverable). About one year after Bass, the defendants in Simply Storage
Mgmt. sought access to their employees' entire social networking accounts. Id. at 434. The court
held that social media content is only discoverable if relevant to the claims at issue. Id. at 434-35.
The court distinguished Bass by noting that, there, the defendants' discovery request was narrow,
as it did not request the plaintiff's entire account, and it was on the court's own motion that the
plaintiff provide the defendants with the entire account. Id.
37 See, e.g., Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(holding entire account was overbroad and undiscoverable absent requisite showing of relevance);
Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., 285 F.R.D. 566, 572 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ("[R]equests [for] 'any
pictures of Plaintiff taken during the relevant time period and posted on Plaintiff's profile or tagged
or otherwise linked to her profile,' is impermissibly overbroad. Defendant fails to make the
threshold showing that every picture of Plaintiff taken over a seven-year period and posted on her
profile by her or tagged to her profile by other people would be considered relevant under Rule
26(b)(1) or would lead to admissible evidence."); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 256 F.R.D.
151, 157 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("All-encompassing demands that do not allow a reasonable person to
ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard [under] Rule
34(b)(1)(A).").
38 Bass v. Miss Porter's School et al., No. 3:08cvl807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1-2 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting that relevance is often subjective). Bass is a pioneer case that
addresses the discoverability of relevant social media content. Id. InBass, the defendants requested
any information on the plaintiff's former Facebook page relating to the allegations in the
complaints. Id. Even though Bass does not address the burden of review, the Bass quote above
highlights one of the reasons the burden of review question is important in the context of social
media discovery. Id. The plaintiff then subpoenaed Facebook to get her former account's
information. Id. Thereafter, the court ordered the plaintiff to provide all Facebook documents
related to the defendant's request and to provide the court the entire record for in camera review.
Id. "[T ]he Court's review of the unproduced portion of the Facebook Production revealed a number
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instance, content that may appear discoverable to one litigant may not appear
discoverable to another. 39 As for review, sometimes neither the producing
party nor the requesting party may be the ideal reviewer because of possible
biases that can result in either: (1) the withholding of information on the part
of the producing party or (2) a rummaging and fishing expedition on the part
of the requesting party.40

III. LIKE A MULTI-TASK SPLIT SCREEN, THE COURTS SPLIT ON
WHO SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF REVIEW
FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) reads, in pertinent part:

(a) In General. A party may serve on any other party a
request within the scope of Rule 26(b):
(1) To produce and permit the requesting party or its
representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the
following items in the responding party's possession,
custody, or control .... 4 1
Further, the procedure for production is as follows:
Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored
Information. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the
court, these procedures apply to producing documents or
electronically stored information:
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the
usual course of business or must organize and label them to
correspond to the categories in the request;
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing
electronically stored information, a party must produce it in

of communications to and from Plaintiff that [were] clearly relevant to [the] action." Id. The court
notes, however, "[t]he selections of documents Plaintiff disclosed to Defendants and those she
referred for in camera review reveal no meaningful distinction." Id.
39 See id. at *1 (noting that plaintiff's production of ESI was "more in the eye of the beholder
than subject to strict legal demarcations.").
40 See id. (noting that relevance depends on the reviewer of content). Although in Bass the
comparison between the documents given to the court and the defendant was insignificant, because
relevance is dependent on the party who is reviewing content, there may be instances where the
producing party does not produce objectively important documents. Id.
41 FED. R. C1v. P. 34(a).
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a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a

reasonably usable form or forms; and
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored
42
information in more than one form.
Evidently, neither the production rule in Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) nor the

procedure rule in Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E) set forth whether the burden of
production encompasses the burden of review for ESI.43 In the social media
context, courts have opined varyingly on who should bear the burden of

reviewing social media content for responsive material-whether (1) the
account holder; (2) the court via in camera review, "an inspection of
materials by the court, in chambers, to determine what, if any, materials are
discoverable;" (3) the requesting party; or (4) third parties. 44 With any of

these methods, except the account holder method, courts are aware of the
risk that a producing party's "embarrassing" content may surface;
nonetheless, the courts allow discovery because they reserve the discretion
to later exclude embarrassing content from evidence under the Federal Rule
of Evidence ("Fed. R. Evid.") 611 (a)(3).,5
A. The TraditionalApproach: Burden on the ProducingParty
The majority view is that the account holder/producing party should
bear the burden of reviewing social media accounts.46 With this approach,

42 FED. R. Cfv. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (setting forth discovery procedural rules for production); FED. R.
CIV.P. 34(b)(2)(E) (prescribing discovery production rules).
44 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-106.5 (West 2007) (defining "in camera
review"); Melissa G. v. N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 6 N.Y.S. 3d 445,447-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2015) (placing burden on account holder); Gonzalez v. City of New York, No. 1219/14, 2015 WL
2191363, at * 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2015) (discussing in camera inspection); Brogan v. Rosenn,
Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-6048, 2013 WL 1742689, at *5 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. Apr. 22, 2013) (explaining Pennsylvania standard for deciding burden allocation).
Pennsylvania courts place the burden on the requesting party when the information is public. See
Brogan, 2013 WL 1742689, at *5. In Brogan, the requesting party's request was outside of the
public infornation realm, and therefore, the court denied the requesting party's motion for
production of the entire account and relied on the producing party. Id.at *8. The court stated,
"[The] demand for... [a] username and password is overly intrusive and would cause unreasonable
embarrassment and burden..." Id.at *1.
45 See Newillv. Campbell Transp. Co., No. 2:12-CV-1344, 2015 WL 267879, at *1-2 (W.D.
Pa. Jan. 14, 2015) (holding defendant could introduce content plaintiff contested as embarrassing);
see also FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3) (allowing courts to exclude evidence to avoid "undue
embarrassment").
46 See Melissa G., 6 N.Y.S.3d at 447-49 (requiring plaintiff's counsel or producing party to
bear burden of review); Giachetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112,
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courts rely on attorney's professional obligations by holding them to their
duties as officers of the court; in other words, the courts depend on account
holders' attorneys to review content honestly and accurately.4 7 Case in point,
the rationale for the approach is that the American adversarial system obliges
the producing party, in good faith, to disclose all relevant, responsive
information in response to an opposing party's request. 4 Where a producing
party fails to exercise good faith, the injured party can seek relief upon a
showing of bad faith. 49 Account holders' attorneys should "keep in mind the
broad scope of discovery" when reviewing for relevance in order to prevent
being accused of bad faith production by the requesting party,
and to mitigate
50
the effect of relevance being in "the eyes of the beholder.,
B. Burden Allocated to the Requesting Party
In some state courts, the requesting party may obtain a party's login

information to access the party's social media content after a requisite
showing of relevance; as such, the requesting party in effect bears the burden
of review, because they have to determine what content within the entire
account is relevant. 51 Courts that allow full access to social media accounts
after a threshold showing of relevance opine that if a producing party's
public information is relevant, then "there is a reasonable likelihood of

117 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (same); Sourdiff v. Texas Roadhouse Holdings, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0408
(TJM/DEP), 2011 WL 7560647, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2011) (same).
47 See Melissa G., 6 N.Y.S.3d at 449 (ordering counsel to review Facebook account because
no basis that counsel could not perform review).
48 Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)(JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *4 (S.D. N.Y. Jan.
20, 2006) (outlining premise of disclosure of information). The Rozell Court held "counsel for...
producing party is the judge of relevance in the first instance." Id. at *3-4. The court was ruling on
the "responsibility for review" in e-discovery of e-mails. Id. at *4.See also Giachetto, 293 F.R.D.
at 117 (citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)(JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *4 (S.D.
N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006)) (requiring producing party to review social media postings for relevance).
41 See Rozell, 2006 WL 163143, at *4 ("Discovery... is based on a good faith response to
demands for production by an attorney constrained by the Federal Rules and by ethical
obligations... When a party can demonstrate that an adversary may be wrongfully withholding
relevant information- it can seek relief.").
50 See id. (explaining it is usually best to interpret relevance broadly when reviewing
documents for relevance).
51 See Zoe Rosenthal, "Sharing" with the Court: The Discoverabilityof PrivateSocial Media
Accounts in CivilLitigation,25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 227,252 (2014) ("A
number of common pleas courts have, upon the requisite showing of relevance, required a party to
provide its adversary with the usernames and passwords for any private social media accounts held
by the complaining individual as a means of producing requested social media material.").
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additional relevant and material information on the non-public portions of

[the party's account].

52

To date, federal courts disagree with this approach, but may allow a
requesting party access to an entire account where a producing party's
credibility is questionable.53 In Crowe v. Marquette Transp. Co. GulfInland54 -the case-in-point for the credibility exception to the general rulethe defendant-employer requested the plaintiff-employee's Facebook
account because the employee alleged that he injured his knee at work, but
the employer had information that the employee told a friend that the injury
took place on a personal fishing trip. 55 At first, the judge required in camera
56
review of the account in lieu of the defendant receiving full access.
However, the employee responded that he no longer had a Facebook account,
which implied deletion, but he actually deactivated, not deleted, the
account.57 When the employee reactivated the account, he provided the court
with 4,000 pages of data.58 Displeased with the plaintiff-employee's
conduct, the court required him to, not only send all 4,000 pages to the
employer, but also allow the employer to log-in to his Facebook account
because his credibility became questionable. 59

52 See Zimmeman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410, at *6 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. May 19, 2011) (articulating holding for authorizing full access); see also Largent v.Reed,
No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 8, 2011) (allowing access to party's
account because doing so is not very burdensome when conducting discovery.); see generally,
Rosenthal, supra note 51, at 252 (explaining advantages in providing narrowly tailored discovery
requests).
53 Compare, e.g.,
Stonebarger v. Union Pac. Corp., No. 13 CV 2137 JAR TJJ., 2014 WL
2986892, at *34 (D. Kan. July 2, 2014) (denying full access, but allowing "defendant to discover
information relevant to plaintiff's emotional state"); Smithy. Hillshire Brands, No. 13 2605 CM,
2014 WL 2804188, at *3-6 (D. Kan. June 20, 2014) (ordering same); Palmav. Metro PCS Wireless,
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (denying request for social media posts from
2010 to present as akin to "rummaging"), with Crowe v. Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf-Inland, No.
14-1130,2015 WL 254633, *111-13 (E.D.La.Jan.20,2015) (requiring plaintiffto relinquish entire
account due to conduct).
54 2015 WL 254633 (E.D.La.Jan. 20, 2015).
55 See id. at*1-2 (reciting facts of case).
56 See id. at*2.
57 See id.("It
isreadily apparent to any user who navigates to the page instructing how to
deactivate an account that the two actions, [deactivating or deleting,] are different.").
58 See id.(stating that Crowe submitted 4,000 pages of data for in camera review).
59 See Crowe, 2015 WL 254633, at *2 ("While the Court has made a preliminary review of
certain of these materials, it is not about to waste its time reviewing 4,000 pages of documents...
when it is patently clear from even a cursory review that this information should have been
produced as part of Crowe's original response."). The court noted that it was "troubled by Crowe's
refusal to produce any responsive documents on the basis of the statement that he did not 'presently
have a Facebook account."' Id. at *6.
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The rationale for federal courts' disagreement with providing the
requesting party with the producing party's login information-where
credibility is not at issue-is that, despite the requirement for a showing of
relevance before the requesting party receives login information, there is,
nonetheless, the risk of fishing expeditions and rummaging of the producing
party's account.60 Moreover, the courts are concerned with allowing a
requesting party access to private areas of the producing party's account.6'
Albeit federal courts' position that social media content shared with others
are not privileged, even when a producing party's profile is set to "private,"
federal courts have not gone so far as to say if there is relevant information
on the shared or public parts of 62
the sites, then the private areas, such as
private messaging, are accessible.
C. In CameraReview
Some courts sua sponte conduct an in camera review to determine
the relevance of the social media content the requesting party demands,
which eliminates the necessity for a court to rely on account holders'
attorneys' professional duties under the majority account holder approach.63
60 See Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (declining

overbroad requests); Keller v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., No. CV 12-72-M-DLC-JCL,
2013 WL 27731, at *4 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2013) (agreeing particularity threshold showing of
relevance approach); Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at * 1
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (declining overbroad requests).
61 See Howell, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 ("Here defendants' discovery request is overbroad.
Howell's username and password would gain defendants access to all the information in the private
sections of her social media accounts relevant and irrelevant alike."); see also Rick E. Kubler &
Holly A. Miller, Recent Developments in Discovery of Social Media Content, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admiistrative/litigation/
materials/2015 inscle materials/written materials/24 1 recent developements in discovery_of
_social media content.authcheckdam.pdf ("One of the most intrusive methods of discovery is to
permit the requesting party access to a user's entire social media account. This would be analogous
to allowing access to someone's entire office when one file might be relevant ... this has been the
least popular method with parties and the courts.").
62 See Tompkins, 278 F.R.D. at 388 (agreeing with threshold showing of relevance approach);
Keller, 2013 WL 27731, at *4 (agreeing with relevance threshold); Howell, 2012 WL 5265170, at

*1 (same).
63 See, e.g., In re Milo's Kitchen Dog Treats Consol. Cases, 307 F.R.D. 177, 183 (W.D. Pa.
2015) (using in camera inspection to review documents for privilege); Spearin v. Linmar, L.P., 11
N.Y.S.3d 156, 156 (App. Div. 2015) (remanding for in camera where trial court ordered accessing
entire Facebook account was overbroad); Gonzalez v. City of New York, No. 1219/14, 2015 WL
2191363, at * 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2015) (granting defendants' motion to compel social media
content production provided there is in camera inspection); Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, 966
N.Y.S.2d 808, 808-09 (App. Tenn 2013) (remanding for in camera review to determine relevant
content). Compare cases cited supra notes 50-52, 57-58 and accompanying text with cases cited
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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Courts may find it practical to order in camera review, for instance, where a
requesting party argues that a plaintiff-account holder's single-handed
redaction of portions of social media content, which she believes to be
irrelevant or privileged, is inappropriate because some of the redactions are
likely relevant and "suspect., 64 Similar to the other approaches, the
requesting party must make some showing of relevance before a court would
65
conduct in camera review.
If a court decides to use the in camera approach, it has broad
discretion to determine the extent to which it will inspect the response when
a thorough review would be unduly burdensome.66 This discretion includes,
for instance, "the right to direct plaintiff to conduct an initial review of her
own Facebook account, and limit the in camera inspection to items whose
discoverability is contested by plaintiff. ' ,67 With this broad discretion, the in
camera review approach furthers Congress' goal in having the judiciary
68
more involved in the e-discovery process.

64 See Milo' Kitchen, 307 F.R.D. at 180, 183 (ordering in camera review to inspect allegedly
irrelevant portions of social media account).
65 Compare Nieves, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 808-09 (holding defendant met requisite showing that
plaintiffs profile contained relevant photographs); Richards v. Hertz Corp., 953 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656
(2012) (ordering full in camera review after showing alleged injury was refuted by Facebook
picture), with Gonzalez, 2015 WL 2191363, at *1 (quoting Patterson v. Turner Constr. Co., 88
A.D.3d 617, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)) (stating, "plaintiff's mere possession and utilization of a
Facebook account is an 'insufficient basis' to compel access to the account.").
66 See Nieves, 966 N.Y. S.2d at 809 (reminding trial court of its discretion to inspect in camera
when remanding for such use). A trial court can "set reasonable terms and conditions thereon." Id.
67 Id.; see also Offenback v. L.M. Bowman_ Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 2491371, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011) ("Plaintiff shall produce the information identified [by the court] ...
to Defendants in a fonnat mutually agreeable to the parties. To the extent that the parties have
continued disagreements regarding the scope or manner of this discovery, they are directed to
contact the Court's deputy clerk...").
68 See FED. R. Cfv. P. 16(b)(3) (illustrating one grant for court involvement). See also, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B) (outlining "permitted contents" of scheduling orders and allowing
courts to modify discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E) (prescribing production rules with
condition "unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court"); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (outlining
discovery-planning rules for parties and giving courts discretion to modify areas of planning); FED.
R. Cfv. P. 37(e) (allowing courts to sanction parties for lack of preservation under certain
conditions). Congress has also previously mentioned greater judicial involvement in the discovery
process. FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment ("[R]ule
contemplates greaterjudicial involvement in the discovery process and thus acknowledges the
reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.").
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D. Review Burden on a Third Party

Third parties that may bear the burden of review are either social
media hosts or court appointed neutral parties. 69 Social media hosts are
"public content sharing websites that allow individual users to upload, view,
and share content such as video clips, press releases, opinions, and other
information[,]" and perform "private" actions, such as direct messaging. 70 In
contrast, court-appointed neutral parties have no connection to the litigation
because they do not provide the social platform, like social hosts, and
because they are not parties in the case. 7'
i. Social Media Hosts
It is unlikely that a court would require a social media host to bear
the burden of review. 72 Courts are reluctant to require social networking
hosts to provide content to requesting parties on the premise that there is no
need for a third party to become involved, especially if a party to the
litigation has access to the account.73
In addition, privacy issues with the Stored Communications Act
("SCA"), which protects production of social users' private information,
may arise if courts require social media hosts to review and produce social

69 See infra notes 73 and 79 and accompanying text (expounding on said parties bearing
burden).
70 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DHS 4300A SENSITIVE SYSTEMS

HANDBOOK, 73 (Version 11.0 2015), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/DHS-4300A-Sensitive-Systems-Handbook-vl _0.pdf (defining "social media
hosts"); see also Marsha Collier, How to Send PrivateMessages to Facebook Friends,DUMIES,
http://www .dummies.com/social-media/facebook/how-to-send-private-messages-to-facebookfriends.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2016) ("Facebook has a feature that enables you to send private
messages to your friends. Think of it like Facebook e-mail, only your personal e-mail address is
not revealed. Even better, you can e-mail those whose e-mail addresses you don't know.").
71 See infa Part III, Section 2 (discussing "Appointed Neutral Third Parties").
72 See infra note 73 (explaining why court would not mandate social host to bear burden of
review).
73 Compare Giachetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 117
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding accessing plaintiff s social postings through third-party was unnecessary
because plaintiff had direct access), with Bass v. Miss Porter's School, No. 3:08cvl 807(JBA), 2009
WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting court did not object to plaintiff subpoena of
Facebook over deleted account); see also Timothy J. Chorvat & Laura E. Pelanek, Electronically
Stored Information in Litigation, 68 BUS. LAW. 245, 249 (2012) ("In contrast to courts'
receptiveness to social media discovery directed to parties, litigants have been largely unsuccessful
in seeking to compel entities that host social media sites to produce information data.").
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media content.74 Whether the SCA protects the content depends on a variety
of factors, including whether it is a criminal or civil case.75 For instance, in
People v. Harris,76 the New York Supreme Court found that a criminal
defendant has no proprietary interests and, therefore, has no protection under
the SCA to quash a subpoena for his or her Twitter or other SNS account.77
As such, the Government was able to compel Twitter to produce the content
from the defendant's account absent a showing of undue burden. 78
ii. Appointed Neutral Third Parties

Some courts have appointed neutral parties of the court, sometimes
called special masters, to review content for relevance; in doing so, a court
is essentially outsourcing in camera review for efficiency. 9 Akin to in
camera review, this approach protects privacy concerns, but unlike in
camera review, a court's burden is either substantially reduced or is
completely delegated to a special master.80 One benefit of such a delegation
74 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1)-(2) (2013) (prescribing SCA); Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note
73, at 249 ("The SCA prevents providers of communication services from disclosing private
communications under specified circumstances. The statute restricts providers from voluntarily
disclosing information in their possession about their users, and limits the government's ability to
compel providers to divulge such information.").
75 See People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (Crim. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Harris I]
(considering criminal defendant's right to quash subpoena for his twitter account information).
76 945 N.Y.S.2d at 508 (deciding defendant does not have standing to quash).
77 See Harris 1, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 508-10 (treating criminal defendant differently under SCA
based on lack of proprietary interests).
78 People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (Crim. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Harris II]. The
opinion reads:
[S]o long as the third party is in possession of the materials, the court may issue an order
for the materials from the third party when the materials are relevant and evidentiary.
Consider the following: a man walks to his window, opens the window, and screams
down to a young lady, "I'm sorry I hit you, please come back upstairs." At trial, the
People call a person who was walking across the street at the time this occurred. The
prosecutor asks, "What did the defendant yell?" Clearly the answer is relevant and the
witness could be compelled to testify. Well today, the street is an online, information
superhighway, and the witnesses can be the third party providers like Twitter, Facebook,
Instragram [sic], Pinterest, or the next hot social media application.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
71 See E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL
5430974, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (appointing special master with similar roles as courts when
conducting in camera).
80 See Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597-98 (Sup. Ct. 2013) ("[A]sking courts to
review hundreds of transmissions 'in camera' should not be the all purpose solution to protect the
rights of litigants. Courts do not have the time or resources to be the researchers for advocates
seeking some tidbit of information that may be relevant in a tort claim. While several courts have
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is that the special master usually performs in camera review in a timelier
fashion. 8' In federal courts, all parties to the litigation usually share the costs

for use of a special master.82 In state courts, however, there may be some
degree of variation; for instance, in New York, "the fees to be paid those
special masters should be paid by the party seeking such discovery in a tort
case, but which may be shared by the parties in a commercial or matrimonial

matter. "83
The appointment of a special master not only addresses privacy
concerns, but also prevents and investigates credibility issues.8 4 For
instance, in E.E.O. C. v. OriginalHoneybakedHam Co.," the Court-though
acknowledging that plaintiff-employees' Facebook accounts may contain
relevant information to the sexual harassment claims-was unconvinced that
"all of [defendant's] alleged areas of relevant information" were actually
relevant.8 6 As such, the court appointed a forensic expert as a special
87
master.
frequently assigned the 'in camera' review to 'special masters,' the fees to be paid those special
masters should be paid by the party seeking such discovery in a tort case, but which may be shared
by the parties in a commercial or matrimonial matter."). Note that in Fawcett, the court neither
allowed in camera nor special master review because no facts indicated that there was information
disclosed on any of the social media accounts requested Twitter, Myspace, Pinterest, etc. about
the subject matter of the lawsuit. Id. See also cases cited supra note 63 and accompanying text
(examining in camera review privacy rationale).
81 FulcrumInquiry, SpecialMasters and Court-AppointedExperts Save ElectronicDiscovery
Costs, HG.ORG LEGAL RESOURCES, http://www.hg.org/article.aspid-5233 (last visited Sept. 16,
2016) [hereinafter Fulcrum Inquiry].
A special master can perform more timely in camera review of documents, since the trial
judge likely has a heavy case load that makes such timely consideration difficult.
Similarly, some cases require a comparison of data contained in plaintiff and defendant
records (for example, customer lists). Typically, neither party wishes the other to see
what is contained in their records. A neutral party can perform the comparison of
electronic records quickly and inexpensively, and produce more narrow but still
acceptable discovery based on the limited group of matched records.
Id.
82 See Honeybaked Ham Co., 2012 WL 5430974, at *2-3 (ordering parties to share costs

associated with appointing special master). The court considered letting the requesting party, the
defendant in this case, bear the burden, but concluded that doing so might be inconsistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
83 See Fawcett, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (explaining standards for production of electronic
discovery and in camera review).
84 See Honeybaked Ham Co., 2012 WL 5430974, at *3 (expressing concern that defendants'
requests were not within scope of relevancy requisites).
85 Id. at *2 (establishing need for special process to collect "discoverable infornation").
86 Id. at*2-3.
87 Id. at *2 (appointing a special master).

concerns. Id.

The Court also acknowledged having privacy

138

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXII

Finally, when a court appoints a special master, it may require 88
a
collaborative effort between the court, the litigants, and the special master.
In Honeybaked Ham Co., although the court appointed a third party, the
review efforts were collaborative.89 The court required the plaintiff to
provide the special master with the login information for the Facebook
accounts and required all parties in the litigation to assist with the special
master's review. 90 The court then set out to review the information the
special master deemed to be relevant via in camera inspection to ensure legal
relevance prior to production to the defendant. 91

IV. METHODS OF REDUCING THE BURDEN OF REVIEW
A. Using the Fed. R. Civ. P. and the Fed. R. ofEvid.
A party can reduce the burden of review by using the Fed. R. Civ. P.
applicable to discovery or even the Fed. R. Evid., where applicable.92 This
section will examine the use of different rules.93
i. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)
First, a party can use Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C), which provides
that "the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery" when the
discovery is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative," or can be retrieved

88 Id. (requiring litigants and special master to cooperate with each other and with court).
89 See id. at *3 (issuing collaborative instructions to discover class members' electronic

information).
90 E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL
5430974, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) ("The parties will collaborate to create (1) a questionnaire
to be given to the Claimants with the intent of identifying all such potential sources of discoverable
information; and (2) instructions to be given to the Special Master defining the parameters of the
information he will collect .... If there are areas of dispute, the parties should provide to the Court
a copy of each document, each of which should clearly distinguish between agreed-upon language
and disputed language. As to the disputed language, the parties should footnote each area of dispute
and briefly state their respective positions. I will review the material, make any necessary
decisions, and return the questionnaire... with the hope that the questionnaire will be given to the
Claimants and the requested information returned at a [specified date], at which time the Special
Master may begin his work.").
91 See Honeybaked Ham Co., 2012 WL 5430974, at *3 (indicating intent to review special

master's work).
92 See infra Part IV, Sections A(1)-(4) (explaining ways to use civil procedure and evidence
rules for burden reduction in e-discovery).
93 See infra Part IV, Sections A(1)-(4) (previewing ensuing analysis).
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in a "more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive" manner. 94 As
such, a party can move a court to limit discovery by pointing to a less
expensive alternative .95 One way courts address the issue of unreasonably
cumulative discovery of social media content is by preventing a requesting
party from making overly broad requests.96
ii. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)
In courts that place the burden on the producing party/account
holder, such party can reduce or eliminate costs through cost-shifting under
97
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), read cohesively.
Under the rules, if a party shows undue burden in producing ESI, the
requesting party may show "good cause," and after a showing of good cause,
a court, in its discretion, may allocate the expenses to the requesting party. 98
A producing party can only use this method if he or she meets the threshold
showing of "undue burden." 99 Though courts make clear that undue burden
does not require inaccessibility of the ESI, circumstances that courts
constitute as "undue burden" may vary; in addition, the Fed. R. Civ. P. do

94 FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i) (setting rule for limiting discovery).
95 See id.(limiting electronic discovery where moving party establishes it "can be obtained
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive").
96 See cases cited supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining threshold for relevance
and courts' disapproval of overbroad requests).
97 See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2)(B) ("A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such
sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
The court may specify conditions for the discovery."); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c) (granting
courts discretion to allocate discovery costs).
98 See, e.g., FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (explaining parties may compel protective order for
limiting discovery or allocation of costs); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (granting courts discretion to
"allocate expenses"); Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 170-71
(3rd Cir. 2012) (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)) ("[T]here is
a 'presumption... that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests.' A responding party, however, 'may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule
26(c) to grant orders protecting him from 'undue burden or expense' in [complying with discovery
requests], including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's payment of the costs
of discovery."').
99 FED. R. C]v. P. 26(b)(2)(B) ("On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the
party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost.").
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not define "good cause." 00 As a result, it is difficult for a producing party
to obtain relief because: (1) meeting the "undue burden" threshold is
generally unpredictable, and (2) it is not clear when production of ESI based
on "good cause" is appropriate.101
iii. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)
Parties may also utilize Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). 10 2 For example,

"[p]ursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 54(d), costs (other than attorney's fees)
should be awarded to a prevailing party unless a statute, rule, or court order
provides otherwise. '"103 The rule "creates a presumption in favor of awarding
costs to prevailing parties, and it is incumbent upon the losing party to
demonstrate why the costs should not be awarded." 104 By that token, a
winning party can assert that a court should include costs associated with e05
discovery of social media content in the award. 1
iv. Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) Orders and The Bucketing Approach
Finally, where the goal of social media content review by the
producing party is to identify privileged information in order to avoid its
production ("privilege review"), the party can use Fed. R. Evid. 502(d)

100 See, e.g., Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00037, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75132, at *12

(W.D. Va. May 31, 2012) ("Rule 26(b)(2)(C) gives the court the ability to 'limit the frequency or
extent of discovery' - regardless of accessibility - whenever 'the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit."'); Adkins v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00041, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75133, at *11 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2012) (same); Hoelting, supra note 3, at 1117-18
("The failure of the Federal Rules to define 'good cause' makes it difficult for courts to determine
when production of ESI is inappropriate .... [C]ourts have not employed a consistent approach
of determining when cost-shifting is appropriate. Thus, even though controlling e-discovery is
largely dependent on the judge's discretion, very few courts actually set production limits or shift
costs.").
101 See Hoelting, supra note 3, at 1117 ("The rules' purposes have not been fulfilled and
producing parties have not received adequate financial relief for several reasons.").
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(D) ("By local rule, the court may establish special procedures to
resolve fee-related issues without extensive evidentiary hearings. Also, the court may refer issues
concerning the value of services to a special master under Rule 53 without regard to the limitations
of Rule 53 (a)(1), and may refer a motion for attorney's fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b)
as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.").
103 PetroliamNasionalBerhadv. GoDaddy.com, Inc., No. C 09-5939 PJH, 2012 WL 1610979,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (citing Stanley v. University of So. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th
Cir.1999)).
104 Id. (discussing presumptive loser bears cost rule).
105 See id. at *1-2 (explaining once cost is not attorney's fees, it is covered by 54(d)).
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orders and "the bucketing approach" to help reduce the burden. 0 6 Fed. R.
Evid. 502(d) orders can prevent waiving privileges in any circumstance,
even if a litigant purposefully produces the privileged documents. 10 7 In
addition, "the bucketing approach allows parties to group together similar
kinds of potentially privileged documents, describe them to opposing parties,
and remove them from review, without having to log each item separately
on a privilege log, which can be a costly process."' 08 In addition to these
tools, litigants should keep abreast the costs the burden-shifting method,
previously mentioned, uses in conjunction with these Fed. R. Evid. tools. 10 9
B. Predictive Coding: Using Technology to Reduce the Burden ofReview
Predictive coding, a computer-assisted review method, is an
inventive tool that the party bearing the burden of review may use to reduce
costs associated with document-by-document review. "to Courts and litigants
commonly refer to predictive coding as computer-assisted review or
technology assisted review; the latter is "the preferred term of art.""'
"Broadly speaking, predictive coding refers to the use of a software program
to identify documents that are relevant to a particular case or issue. [It]
involves a machine learning process and a combination of different
algorithmic tools.""11 2 In predictive coding, attorneys use a small set of
documents, called a "seed set," to "train" the machine to recognize what

106

See Bennett B. Borden, Monica McCarroll & Neil Magnuson, Williams Mullen: Are You

Sure You Want Those Documents? Then You Might Have to Pay ForReviewing Them, LEXIS NEXIS
LEGAL NEWSROOM LITIGATION, Aug. 3, 2012, 3:08 PM,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/ediscovery/archive/2012/08/03/williamsmullen-are -you-sure -you-want-those -documents-then-you-might-have -to-pay -for-reviewingthem.aspx (expounding application of Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) and "bucketing approach" for cost and
burden reduction).
107 See id.(explaining that a Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) order "protects parties from the waiver of
privilege[s]" because it can "remove the 'reasonableness' determination that is required").
108 Id. (analyzing Adair and Adkins cases where bucketing approach allowed parties to keep
potentially privileged emails).
109 Id. ("[The Court] [e]xplicitly [h]olds that [c]ourts [m]ay [c]onsider the [c]ost of [r]eviewing
[e]lectronically-[s]tored [i]nformation for [p]rivilege in [a]ssessing [b]urden of [p]roduction and
[m]ay [s]hift [c]ost to [r]equesting [p]arty [b]ased on [b]urden").
110 See Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting acceptance
of predictive coding in ESI).
...See id.(noting e-discovery community still uses terms predictive coding and computer
assisted review, but not often).
112 William M. Hampton, Predictive Coding: It's Here to Stay, E-DISCOVERY BULLETIN 29
(June/July
2014),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/LIT_JuneJulyl4_
EDiscoveryBulletin.pdf (defining predictive coding).
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documents are relevant or privileged in a particular case. 113 An attorney
thereafter reviews the program's coding decisions for accuracy while
rejecting or accepting each decision-an iterative round process. 114 Based

on the feedback, the software then recodes to improve its accuracy."l 5 The
software is trained until it agrees with an experienced attorney's decisions,
and then the software applies its coding to all documents 117
in the selected ESI
pool. 116 But, there does not have to be 100% agreement.
Although predictive coding or technology assisted review is a
sophisticated review method, courts hold it to the same standard as other8
search methodologies, such as keyword searches and manual reviews."1
Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck of the Southern District of New York, in Da
Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe 1 9 was the first judge to "recognize that
computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in
appropriate cases. "120 In that case, the document set that the litigants agreed
to review with predictive coding was mainly a set of e-mails. 121 Nonetheless,
the use of predictive 1coding
can assist in discovery of other ESI, including
22
social media content.

Since Judge Peck's decision in Da Silva Moore, courts have been
23
accepting of the use of predictive coding, and the case law is expanding. 1
113 See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted
sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 CIV. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (rejecting litigant's proposition that predictive coding is "unreliable.");
see also, Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note 73, at 253 ("Unlike traditional document review, predictive
coding involves attorneys coding a small set of documents, which the computer uses to code other
documents, until the system's predictions and reviewers' coding are sufficiently aligned.");
Hampton, supra note 112, at 30-31 (describing when predictive coding is useful in litigation).
114 See Hampton, supra note 112, at 29.
115 See id. (explaining purpose of iterative process).
116 See id. (expounding on "training" process through iteration).
117 See Da Silva Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 186 (exhibiting parties agreed to "95% confidence
level").
118 See Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("[lit is
inappropriate to hold TAR to a higher standard than keywords or manual review. Doing so
discourages parties from using TAR for fear of spending more in motion practice than the savings
from using TAR for review.").
119 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding predictive coding is acceptable inESI).
120 Id. at 183 (mentioning use of predictive coding may not be appropriate sometimes because
of this review objective).
121 See id. at 187 ("The parties agreed on certain ESI sources..
122 See id. at 194 (speaking of ESI in general rather than singling out e-mails or other ESI
sources).
123 Rio Tinto, 306 F.R.D. at 127 ("In the three years since Da Silva Moore, the case law has
developed to the point that it is now black letter law that where the producing party wants to utilize
TAR for document review, courts will permit it."). See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. HSBC N.
Am. Holdings Inc., No. 11 CIV. 6189 DLC, 2014 WL 584300, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014)
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One issue that has surfaced with its use is whether transparency and
cooperation, such as "giving ...full access to the seed set's responsive and
non-responsive documents (except privileged)[J" is required where parties

do not agree to transparency. 124 Because whether the rules of discovery
require transparency of seed sets is unclear, some courts may require
transparency and cooperation. 125 The In re Biomet 126 court, however, the
Court opined that allowing such transparency is beyond the scope of

discoverable material in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(2)(C), and a court has no authority
to expand that scope and compel full access to an opposing litigant's entire
seed set. 127 Mirroring In re Biomet, Judge Peck, while revisiting the Da Silva
Moore opinion in Rio Tinto,128 held that although cooperation and
transparency is preferred, it is up to the responding party to decide. 29
(illustrating predictive coding usually has higher accuracy rate than manual review); Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Delaney et al., No. 2:11-CV-00678-LRH-PAL, 2014 WL 3563467, at *8-9 (D.
Nev. July 18, 2014) (warning that litigants should not raise plans to use predictive coding late in
litigation); Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-380S(F), 2013 WL 2250603, at
*3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (giving deference to use of predictive coding); Nat'l Day Laborer
Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87, 109, 111-12 (S.D.
N.Y. 2012) (suggesting parties should use predictive coding). See also United States v.
ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., No. 4:13-CV-00355 KGB, 2014 WL 2593781, at *6-8 (E.D. Ark. June
10, 2014) (agreeing that predictive coding should be raised early).
124 See Rio Tinto, 306 F.R.D. at 128.
125See id. (stating trial judge in different case mandated transparency, cooperation, and
plaintiff access to set's documents ); Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs., No. 3:131196, 2014 WL 4923014, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 22, 2014) (requiring "full openness" regarding
predictive coding seed set).
126 In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-MD-2391, 2013 WL
6405156, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2013).
127 Compare, e.g., BridgestoneAmericas,2014 WL 4923014, at *1 (requiring "[full] openness
and transparency" because it approved predictive coding after discovery commenced), and In re
Actos (Pioglitazone) Products Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-MD-2299, 2012 WL 7861249, at *5 (W.D.
La. July 27, 2012) (stating litigants "may meet and confer" to discuss seed set if seeding takes
place), with In re Biomet, 2013 WL 6405156, at *2 (requiring litigants to share set if beyond scope
of Fed. Civ. P.). See Rio Tinto, 306 F.R.D. at 128 ("Where the parties do not agree to transparency,
the decisions are split and the debate in the discovery literature is robust.").
128 See id. at 127 (revisiting predictive coding to set standards).
129 See id. at 128-29. Judge Peck stated:
[W]hile [the court] generally believe[s] in cooperation, requesting parties can insure that
training and review was done appropriately by other means, such as statistical estimation
of recall at the conclusion of the review as well as by whether there are gaps in the
production, and quality control review of samples from the documents categorized [as]
non-responsive.
Id. The court also reiterates that inIn re Biomet, Judge Miller ruled that he could not require parties
to share seed sets because there was no authority allowing him to do so. Id.at 128; see also cases
cited supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text (articulating Judge Miller's In re Biomet
opinion).
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Finally, with predictive coding, litigants should bear in mind that
this cost reduction approach is usually best suited for instances where data is
overwhelming to review.130 As Judge Peck concludes in Da Silva Moore,
"[c]omputer-assisted review is an available tool and should be seriously
considered for use in large-data-volume cases where it may save the
producing party (or both parties) significant amounts of legal fees in

document review. "131 Litigants should also note, however, that appropriate
cases for predictive coding are not restricted to "large-data-volume cases.' 32
The operative word is "appropriate.'

33

Therefore, litigants and judges

34
should make determinations as to its use under the circumstances. 1

130 See Chorvat & Pelanek, supra note 73, at 254 (noting Judge Peck's reasoning that
predictive coding is neither mandated nor appropriate in all cases).
131 Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted sub
nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 CIV. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 26, 2012) (approving not mandating litigants use of predictive coding).
132 See id ("[The Opinion] does not mean computer-assisted review must be used in all cases,
or that the exact ESI protocol approved here will be appropriate in all future cases that utilize
computer-assisted review.").
133 See id; Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 CIV. 1279 ALC AJP, 2012 WL 1446534, at *3
(S.D. N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Adoption of Moore Opinion] (adopting Judge Peck's
opinion). In adopting Judge Peck's opinion, District Judge Carter, Jr. stated:
There simply is no review tool that guarantees perfection ... [T]here are risks inherent
in any method of reviewing electronic documents. Manual review with keyword
searches is costly, though appropriate in certain situations... [S]uch review is prone to
human error and marred with inconsistencies from the various attorneys' determination
of whether a document is responsive.
Judge Peck concluded that under the
circumstances of this particular case, the use of the predictive coding software as
specified in the ESI protocol is more appropriate than keyword searching. The Court
does not find a basis to hold that his conclusion is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Thus, Judge Peck's orders are adopted and Plaintiffs' objections are denied.
Id.
134 See Adoption ofMoore Opinion, 2012 WL 1446534, at *3 (endorsing predictive coding for
cases that call for its use); see also Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., No. 11
CIV. 6189 DLC, 2014 WL 584300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014) (explaining no method of
document review is perfect and predictive coding only requires good faith). The Court eloquently
proclaims:
Parties in litigation are required to be diligent and to act in good faith in producing
documents in discovery. The production of documents in litigation such as this is a
herculean undertaking, requiring an army of personnel and the production of an
extraordinary volume of documents. Clients pay counsel vast sums of money in the
course of this undertaking, both to produce documents and to review documents received
from others. Despite the commitment of these resources, no one could or should expect
perfection from this process. All that can be legitimately expected is a good faith,
diligent commitment to produce all responsive documents uncovered when following
the protocols to which the parties have agreed, or which a court has ordered.
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V. NOT "SIMPLY OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE"
Courts should merge the varying burden of review methods into one
consistent rule that recognizes the underlying rationales behind all the
approaches, while observing the policy rationale behind the Fed. R. Civ. P.,
such as the efficiency and low cost policies. 135 To best achieve that goal,
courts should use a burden-shifting framework that encompasses a balancing
test ("burden-shifting balancing test").136 Initially, courts should conduct
minimal in camera review to screen a requesting party's discovery request
for relevance.137 Then, if relevance appears satisfied, the producing party
should bear the burden of reviewing the content thoroughly unless: (1) the
requesting party can show that the producing party's credibility is
questionable
or
(2)
the
producing
party
contests

responsiveness/discoverability or claims privilege as to certain items after
reviewing the content thoroughly. 138 If the requesting party successfully puts
credibility at issue, then the court should either: (1) conduct a thorough in

camera review, (2) allow the requesting party full access to the account, (3)
appoint a neutral party, also known as a "special master," or (4) a
combination of two or more of these options, based on the circumstances. 139
A non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in deciding which of these
methods to use include: (1) the requesting party's conduct and character, (2)
the producing party's conduct and character, (3) the content requested and
Id.
135 See supra Part III (outlining varying approaches and explaining their rationales); see also
supra Part II (noting Fed. R. Civ. P. policies).
136 See supra Part II (showing burden of review question needs consistent rule).
137 See Offenbackv. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 2491371, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. June 22, 2011) (ordering plaintiff to produce certain materials after in camera review); Nieves
v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, 966 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808-09 (App. Div. Apr. 11, 2013) (noting courts
have broad discretion in deciding extent of in camera review).
138 See sources cited supra note 61 (stating in camera review may be modified to be necessary
where plaintiff contests discoverability); see also Bass v. Miss Porter's School, No.
3:08cv1807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting policy for account
holders bearing burden of review). Note also that where counsel fails to review in good faith, there
should be a remedy. See In re Milo's Kitchen Dog Treats Consol. Cases, 307 F.R.D 177, 178 (W.D.
Pa. 2015).
139 See supra note 64 (explaining in camera review fits when credibility issues surface); see
also Crowe v. Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf-Inland, No. 14-1130, 2015 WL 254633, at *2 (E.D. La.
Jan. 20, 2015) (stating access to full account may be permitted if producing party's credibility is in
question); see also E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560-MSK-MEH,
2012 WL 5430974, at *2-3 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (explaining use of neutral party helps eliminate
issues of credibility and honesty).
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0
the relative risks of rummaging, and (4) stipulations between the parties.14
Moreover, if a producing party contests discoverability or asserts privilege,
then the court should conduct thorough in camera review. 141 Finally, if an
account is unavailable or inaccessible to a producing party, then the third

party social media host can be subpoenaed, and thereafter, the same test for
review put forth should be followed. 142 The rationales for the proposed rule
143

follows.

A. Tier ](a): Minimal In Camera Review
Many courts and scholars believe social media data should be treated
the same way as other types of data, which means they believe that the
burden of review should be on the producing party. 144 Treating social media
content just like other content and applying the traditional approach,
however, does not consider the uniqueness of social media content; this
uniqueness is the reason some
courts used alternate approaches when dealing
45
with social media content. 1
Although benefits, such as impartiality in reviewing documents for
discoverability come with the in camera review approach, it is not in the
interest of the courts to conduct a full or thorough in camera review at all

140 See cases cited supra notes 53-59 (producing party's conduct tainted his credibility and

court allowed requesting party to review account); see also cases cited supra notes 52-53 (stating
one relevant entry on producing party's account does not justify requesting party gaining access.);
cases cited supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (explaining social host may intervene if
producing party has no access to account, but need for social host unlikely.).
141 See Milo ' Kitchen, 307 F.R.D at 183.
[Ojut of an abundance of caution, the Court finds that the best course is to have Plaintiff
produce the claimed privileged documents to the Court so that an in camera inspection
can be conducted. In this manner, any truly privileged infornation will remain protected
and Defendants can proceed confident that they have received all the relevant and
nonprivileged information from Plaintiff's Facebook data.
Id.
142 See supra note 73 (explaining that courts are only comfortable with bringing third party
social media hosts into the picture where a social media account is unavailable.).
143 See infra Part V, Sections A-F (expounding upon reasoning for proposed rules).
144 See Broganv. Rosen, Jenkins & Greenwalk, LLP, 27 Pa. D. & C. 5ih 533 (2013) ("[T]he
resolution of social media discovery disputes pursuant to existing Rules of Procedure is simply new
wine in an old bottle."); see also McPeak, supra note 14, at 945 ("The better solution is to treat
social media data the same as other forms of evidence.").
145 See infra Part V, Section A (explaining why starting with minimal in camera review is
ideal); see also supra Part III (outlining different methods of review).
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times. 146 Such an across-the-board rule would require courts to invest a
considerable amount of time and money into social media discovery, which
is not in the interest of judicial efficiency. 147 To balance the goals of
impartial review and efficiency, a limited minimal in camera review would
48
be best after the requisite showing of relevance by the requesting party. 1
Minimal in camera review is allowed because courts have broad
discretion in deciding how to administer an in camera review. 149 As such,

courts have the authority to conduct a minimal review as a pre-screening
tactic to ensure relevance, reduce the effect
of potentially biased review, and
50
help to prevent blatant dishonest review. 1
When a non-neutral party conducts review, biased review is likely
151
because "relevance of the content ... is ...in the eye of the beholder."
For example, if the initial reviewer is the producing party, he or she may
view certain data as undiscoverable even though a neutral party may believe
otherwise. In the alternative, if a requesting party is the reviewer, he or she
may see certain data as discoverable while a neutral party may have the
opposite opinion. 152 These variations in review cause disputes over content's
relevancy. 153 If courts perform an initial minimal in camera review, courts
can prevent or reduce disputes over what content is relevant between the
parties. 154 The court is a neutral party that should have no motive for
attempting to deem content responsive without a basis. 155 Therefore, a court
would not need to step in to settle a dispute on the discoverability of a
particular piece of content. 156 Moreover, this approach has the potential to
146 See Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597-98 (Sup. Ct. 2013) ("[A]sking courts to
review hundreds of transmissions 'in camera' should not be the all purpose solution to protect the
rights of litigants."); see also Fulcrum Inquiry, supra note 81 ("A special master can perform more
timely in camera review of documents, since the trial judge likely has a heavy case load that makes
such timely consideration difficult.").
147 See Fawcett, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98 (mentioning in camera review should not be an "all

purpose solution").
148 See id.(warning of dangers of overusing in camera review). A minimal review would be
less burdensome than the burden Fawcett highlights. See id.
149 See Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, 966 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808-09 (App. Div. Apr. 11,
2013) (highlighting courts' broad discretion in limiting in camera review).
150 See id.The broad discretion courts have would encompass this type of minimal review. Id.
151 See Bass v. Miss Porter's School, No. 3:08cv1807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1-'2 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (highlighting perception of relevance may be influenced by reviewing party).
152 Id. (discussing sometimes these discrepancies are simply honest, different perceptions.).
153 Id. (varying perceptions result in disagreement).
154 See id.(varying perceptions are due to bias, whether conscious or unconscious). Hence, a
neutral party, such as the court, is the most reliable perception. See id.
155 See In re Milo's Kitchen Dog Treats Consol. Cases, 307 F.R.D. 177, 183 (W.D. Pa. 2015)
(realizing courts do not have to rely on judgment of others with in camera review).
156 See id.
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reduce dishonest review and spoliation because, unlike the traditional
approach, the producing party would be on notice that the court has prior
57
knowledge of the account.1
Lastly, starting with minimal review would achieve greater judicial
involvement that the Fed. R. Civ. P. aim for, while keeping the burden on
the court low. 158 "Minimal" is the keyword because in camerareview in the
first instance would not place an overly heavy burden on courts. 5 9 The
courts will not be reviewing contents entirely; rather, courts will review
contents sufficiently enough to see whether portions of requests are
relevant. 160 As such, most situations, like "status updates on Facebook
within the past month" or "pictures on Instagram over the past two months,"

would not warrant minimal review of an entire account, such as where a
requesting party makes a targeted request.161 In addition, because requesting
parties know that the court will perform an initial check, they are more likely

to craft their requests in a targeted
manner so as not to upset the court by
62
1
resources.
and
time
wasting
Some scholars may argue that minimal in camera review increases

the potential for courts to come across "embarrassing" content from the
producing party, but this is a trivial risk at the discovery stage. 163 Instead, a
157 See sources cited supra note 35 (noting obligation called "duty to preserve"). Lack of
following preservation duties is called spoliation. Id.
158 See source cited supra note 35 (noting Congress's consistent push for greater judicial
involvement in discovery process).
159 See generally Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, 966 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (App. Div. Apr.
11, 2013) (noting court's broad discretion in limiting in camera review).
160 See id. at 808-09 (limiting in camera review to contested discoverable items).
161 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (noting "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case .... "); FED. R. Cfv. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (stating, "The request ... must describe with
reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected.").
162 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (prescribing requests must be relevant and targeted); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (noting discovery requests must be made with particularity). Because
of the statutory law in place, a requesting party' s broad request, which disregards the particularity
relevance rule, would peeve a court. See Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566,
572 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
[R]equests [for] "any pictures of Plaintiff taken during the relevant time period and
posted on Plaintiff's profile or tagged or otherwise linked to her profile," is
impermissibly overbroad. Defendant fails to make the threshold showing that every
picture of Plaintiff taken over a seven-year period and posted on her profile by her or
tagged to her profile by other people would be considered relevant under Rule 26(b)(1)
or would lead to admissible evidence.
Id.
163 See McPeak, supra note 14, at 945 (stating review of entire accounts may "be embarrassing
or unfair for the account holder"). Other scholars may also believe that minimal in camera review
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court is more likely to direct the producing party to give the court notice or
attempt to exclude the content at trial under Fed. R. Evid. 611, if anything
64
particularly embarrassing may surface in a minimal review.1

can be embarrassing although the court is not going through every detail of the account holder's
account. Id.
164 See Newill v. Campbell Transp. Co., No. 2:12 CV 1344, 2015 WL 267879, *1-2 (W.D.
Pa. Jan. 14, 2015) (holding defendant was allowed to introduce content plaintiff contested as
embarrassing).
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B. Tier l(b): ProducingParty Bears Burden to Review Courts 'Selections
Thoroughly
Allocating the burden of review to the producing party only after a
requisite minimal review is logical.165 One benefit of adding a requisite
minimal review for a producing party, is that he or she would not have to
thoroughly search through every single item of entire accounts-saving
associated costs.166 The rationales for a producing party to bear the burden
are that: (1) the producing party is most knowledgeable of the account and
can therefore be very effective at thorough review of the portions the court
has selected; and (2) allocating the burden to the producing party maintains
167
privacy.
Review of the court's selection by the producing party is a good
safety net in case a court overlooks any relevant areas during minimal in
camera review, because the producing party would still be under the
obligation to review the selected content in good faith. 168 Therefore, a
remedy is still available to a requesting party if a producing party attempts
to withhold responsive information by, for example, using the excuse that
the court did not say that a certain part is responsive. 169 To illustrate, if the
court says a picture album titled "Vacation in the Virgin Islands" is
responsive and directs the producing party to review it thoroughly, and there
happens to be a subfolder or multiple subfolders within that album, then the
producing party should thoroughly review all subfolders.
This prong would complete the reviewing process unless the
requesting party puts credibility at issue, or the producing party contests
responsiveness or claims privilege.170 If the court disagrees that credibility
is at issue, the burden would stay on the producing party, and the requesting
party can get relief if the producing party does not review and produce in
good faith.171

165 See supra Part V, Section A.
166 See Hoelting, supra note 3, at 1112 and accompanying text (highlighting that thousands of
pages involved in social media content makes discovery very costly).
167 See supra Part III, Section A (discussing traditional approach to burden of review).

168 See cases cited supra note 48 and accompanying text (producing party should conduct
broad discovery to honor obligation of producing in good faith).

169See Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)(JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 20, 2006) (requesting party has available remedies if producing party does not produce in good

faith.).

170 See infra Parts C and D.

171See case cited supra note 169 (explaining requesting party has available remedies if
producing party does not produce in good faith).
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C. Tier 2 (a): CredibilitySuccessfully at Issue
Disqualifying a producing party from reviewing social media
content when his or her credibility is questionable maintains the integrity of
the discovery process and is in accordance with the policies of the Fed. R.
Civ. p.17 2 Where a requesting party successfully calls into question the
trustworthiness of a producing party, a court should use the balancing factors
previously stated and outlined below to decide which alternative method of
review is best because this prong is fact-sensitive. 173 The factors, discussed
in detail below, are a compilation of common considerations courts use in
74
cases when varying fact patterns surface in judging credibility. 1
i. The Requesting Party's Conduct and Character
This factor should focus on whether the requesting party's conduct
shows an attempt to engage in fishing expeditions; the factor should go hand
in hand with the third factor-"the content requested and relative risks of
rummaging.' 175 As stated, courts are wary of fishing expeditions and, in
addition, the Fed. R. Civ. P. do not allow such expeditions.176 Therefore,
examining the requesting party's conduct and character factor calls for a
court to evaluate whether the requesting party made reasonable production
requests.1 77 In other words, a court should ask whether all of the "alleged
areas of relevant information" appear to have some relation to the claims at
issue. 178 A court should further inquire into whether a requesting party's
goal is to gain access to the full account in an attempt to go fishing; an
unreasonable discovery requests that clearly have no relevance to claims at
172 See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (outlining sanctions for dishonesty); see also Rozell, 2006 WL
163143, at *4 (mentioning that broad scope of discovery can help prevent sanction for dishonest
practice).
173 See cases cited supra notes 52-53 (summarizing when requesting parties may and may not
gain access to producing parties' accounts.); see also sources cited supra note 72 and accompanying
text (discussing social host may intervene if producing parties have no access to requested account).
174 See cases cited supra notes 52-53 (considering access to private portions of social media
allows requesting party access to irrelevant information).
175 See infra Part V, Section C(3) (detailing consent requested); see also cases cited supra
notes 52-53 (noting one relevant piece of information means access is given).
176 See supra notes 39, 60 and accompanying text (explaining that courts do not permit parties
to engage in overbroad requests or fishing expeditions).
177 See id.(same); see also E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2-3 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (appointing special master to look
into " [d]efendant's alleged areas of relevant information").
178 See Honeybaked Ham Co., 2012 WL 5430974, at *3 (preventing fishing expedition by
appointing special master to examine "[d ] efendant's alleged areas of relevant information").
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issue is one indication of such a goal.179 Any conduct of this sort would
weigh in favor of either a thorough in camera review or the appointment of

a special master, because an attempt to fish shows that a requesting party
would abuse full access to a producing party's account. 80 Whether a court
chooses between the thorough in camera review or a special master would
depend on factors, such as the court's docket, the amount of content, and any
stipulations between the parties.""
ii. The Producing Party's Conduct and Character

In evaluating the requesting party's conduct and character, a court
should look to see whether the level of dishonesty was so blatant and
intentional, such as the plaintiff lying about account accessibility or
overproducing documents on purpose, that the court could disregard any
privacy issues. 18 2 The conduct in Crowe v. Marquette Transp. Co. GulfInland 8 3 is significant because federal courts generally do not give
requesting party's full access to an account because of privacy and

179

See, e.g., Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389 (E.D. Mich. 2012)

(holding request for entire account was overbroad and undiscoverable absent requisite showing of
relevance); Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 572 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (denying
request as "impermissibly overbroad" under Rule 26(b)(1)); Id. (citing In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig., 256 F.R.D. 151, 157 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (noting "all-encompassing" request does not meet
particularity requirement).
180 See cases cited supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (explaining in camera review
maintains privacy and would prevent fishing); see also cases cited supra notes 84-86 and
accompanying text (demonstrating special master like a court is a mutual party, and rationales
for having special master are essentially the same as in camera review).
181 See FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(f)(2) (showing Congress encourages agreements by parties in
discovery conferences). See also Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597-98 (Sup. Ct. 2013).
[A]sking courts to review hundreds of transmissions "in camera" should not be the all
purpose solution to protect the rights of litigants. Courts do not have the time or resources
to be the researchers for advocates seeking some tidbit of information that may be
relevant in a tort claim. While several courts have frequently assigned the "in camera"
review to "special masters," the fees to be paid those special masters should be paid by
the party seeking such discovery in a tort case, but which may be shared by the parties
in a commercial or matrimonial matter.
Id.; see also Fulcrum Inquiry, supra note 81 ("A special master can perform more timely in camera
review of documents, since the trial judge likely has a heavy case load that makes such timely
consideration difficult.").
182 Crowe v. Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf-Inland, No. CIV.A.14-1130, 2015 WL 254633, at
*1-4 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2015) (holding plaintiff thwarted his credibility so full access to his account
was allowable).
183 Id.
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rummaging reasons. 184 When the requesting party successfully puts the
producing party's credibility at issue, Crowe is a good measure for the type
of conduct that would warrant giving a requesting party full access to an
85
account because such types of cases are rare. 1
If a court finds the level of dishonesty to be, in fact, intentional and
blatant, then this factor would weigh in favor of ordering the producing party
to provide the requesting party with the login information for the account. 86
The stance that courts should take such an approach in such types of cases is
based on the policy that courts and legislatures expect attorneys to act
18 7
honestly in order for the discovery process to be fair and honest.
Therefore, it would be fair for a court to deem a blatantly dishonest plaintiff
who lies intentionally, or does something equally gross, to have practically
forfeited his or her right of privacy, similar to how a criminal defendant has
no expectation of privacy under the SCA. 88
' A court should not have to use
its resources and time to thoroughly conduct in camera review to protect an
intentionally dishonest producing party's privacy.' 89
Any privileged
information that may be revealed by allowing full access to a requesting
party can be remedied by Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) to prevent waiver of any
privileges.190 Furthermore, as a measure to prevent fishing expeditions, a
court can warn a requesting party that the purpose of gaining access to the
account is to aid discovery for the claims at issue, and that the duties to
refrain from fishing expeditions still apply. 191

184 See cases cited supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting federal courts' disagreement
with allowing requesting party's full access to producing party's account).
185 See Crowe, 2015 WL 254633, at *3 (expressing disappointment in producing party's
behavior).
186 Id. at *8 (ordering plaintiff-producing party to give full access to account).
187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (explaining sanctions for dishonesty); see also Melissa G. v. N.

Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 6 N.Y.S. 3d 445, 447-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (mentioning
producing party's professional responsibility to produce honestly).
188 See HarrisII, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 596 (Crim. Ct. 2012) (articulating criminal defendant has

no protection of privacy under SCA); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining
case).
189 See Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597-98 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (elucidating court must

use considerable time and resources to conduct thorough in camera review). Because of the time
and resources a court must use in conducting a complete, thorough in camera review, Fawcett states
that in camera should not be the go-to safety net to resolve all disputes. Id.
190 Borden, supra note 106 (explaining use of FED. R. EVID. 502(d) to protect revealed
privileges).
191 See Rosenthal, supra note 51, at 252 (requesting party must meet requisite showing of

relevance before receiving username and password).
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iii. The Content Requested and Relative Risks of Rummaging
In looking at the content and relative risk of rummaging factor, a
court should focus on the amount of content requested, such as whether it is
an entire account, and look closely at the first factor: "the requesting party's
conduct and character." 92 To recap, there is a high risk of fishing
expeditions and rummaging by the requesting party if the court decides to
allocate the burden to the requesting party. 193 Hence, if a requesting party
requests an entire account, unless the court finds that the producing party's
conduct was intentional and blatant under the "producing party's conduct
and character factor" above, the content requested factor should weigh
against allowing a requesting party full access to the producing party's
account, and therefore, in favor of in camera review or the appointment of a
94
special master. 1
A court should also be especially careful when the requesting party

requests a private portion of an account, such as "direct messages" on
Instagram or instant messages on Facebook. 95 Although private areas may
have relevant content, federal courts are reluctant to allow a requesting party
access here because private areas will also contain irrelevant information, or
even privileged information that may be contained in personal instant
197
messages. 196 As such, the risk of rummaging, yet again, surfaces.
Therefore, if the content requested is located in such an area, this factor

192 See supra Part V, Section C(1) (describing the "conduct and character" factor); see sources

cited supra notes 60-62 (stating federal courts are reluctant to giving requesting party's full access
to accounts).
193 See Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (declining
overbroad requests); Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (same); see also Keller v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., No. CV
12-72-M-DLC-JCL, 2013 WL 27731, at *4 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2013) (agreeing with particularity
threshold showing of relevance approach).
194 See sources cited supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining in camera review's
neutrality); see also In re Milo's Kitchen Dog Treats Consol. Cases, No. 12 1011, 2015 WL
1650963, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2015) (exemplifying in camera inspection to review for
privilege). See also supra Part V, Section C(1) (describing "conduct and character" factor).
195 Howell, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 (revealing privacy is still concern despite social media
data is generally public).
196 See id. at *1 ("Here defendants' discovery request is overbroad. Howell's username and
password would gain defendants access to all the information in the private sections of her social
media accounts-relevant and irrelevant alike.").
197 See Palma v. Metro PCS Wireless, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
(holding request for all social media posts was overbroad and would result in rummaging); Howell,
2012 WL 5265170, at *1 ("The fact that the information defendants seek is in an electronic file as
opposed to a file cabinet does not give them the right to rummage through the entire file. The same
rules that govern the discovery of information in hard copy documents apply to electronic files.").
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should weigh in favor of in camera review or the appointment of a special
master. 198
Another option that courts have is to conduct in camera review for
private portions and allow the requesting party to review non-private
portions to reduce the courts' burden. 199 However, rummaging is still likely
to occur on public parts of the account, so this is a less reliable option.0 0
Though in camera review or a special master would be best to prevent
fishing expeditions and privacy issues where a producing party's credibility
is at issue, admittedly, allocating the burden of review to the requesting party
in such situations would likely force a requesting party to be mindful of the
costs and time associated with their requests. 20 1 As such, allocating the

burden to a requesting party who makes overbroad requests, such as the
password for an entire account, may help to prevent overbroad requests in
the first place.20 2 Nonetheless, such an approach would be less effective than
the in camera review or special master approach when considering the goals
of preventing fishing expeditions and maintaining privacy.203

198 See Palma, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 1347; Howell, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1
199 See E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560-MSK-MEIEH, 2012 WL
5430974, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (noting appointment of special master is outsourcing in
camera review); see also sources cited supra note 63 (eliciting neutrality of in camera review).
200 See Palma, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (explaining request for all social media posts was
overbroad and would lead to rummaging).
201 See Hoelting, supra note 3, at 1119 (noting burden of review fight is driven by the high
costs of reviewing social media).
202 See generally FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(1) (explaining goal of Fed. R. Civ. P. is to have
requesting parties make relevant requests). Rule 26(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
[U]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access
to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(1)(A) ("The request: ... must describe with reasonable
particularity each item or category of items to be inspected."); Silva v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc.,
No. 3:14cv580 (WWE)(WIG), 2015 WL 1275840, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 19, 2015) ("That the
instant motion seeks an order to compel social media communications, rather than hard copy
materials, does not take it out of the ambit of Rule 26's relevancy requirements.").
203 See Howell, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 (mentioning reluctance to allow parties to review
private areas of social media accounts); supra Part V, Section C(1) (explaining goals to prevent
fishing and protect privacy in relation to "content requested").
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iv. Stipulations between the Parties
The stipulation between the parties factor is simply to recognize the
general principle that courts usually honor agreements between parties about
discovery that are agreed upon at the discovery conference. 0 4 In examining
the stipulation between the parties factor, the courts should check to see if
the parties have agreed on allocating the burden to a special master, and if
20 5
so, how they have proposed to split the costs.
D. Tier 2(b): ContestedResponsiveness or Privilege
As previously mentioned, courts are in the best position to review
206isnt'
disputes because of their neutrality and expertise.
Under this note's
proposed approach, a requesting party is likely to argue that because the
court pre-screened the content in a minimal review, then, a producing party's
claim of privilege becomes especially "suspect." 20 7 As such, if the minimal
in camera review fails at mitigating potential disputes as to discoverability
and a producing party contests to responsiveness or privilege, then a court
should either deny the producing party's claim or conduct a full, thorough in
camera review of the contested area. 20 8 Note that a court should not allocate

204 FED. R. CIV.P. 26(f)(2). The rule provides, in full:

(2) Conference Content; Parties' Responsibilities. In conferring, the parties must
consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for
promptly settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures required by
Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information; and
develop a proposed discovery plan. The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties
that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging the conference, for
attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to
the court within 14 days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. The
court may order the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in person.
Id.
205 See id. (noting parties' responsibilities in discussing agreements at discovery conference).
206 See cases cited supra notes 151-156 (explaining relevance is "in the eyes of the beholder"

and court's neutrality in settling discovery); see also In re Milo's Kitchen Dog Treats Consol.
Cases, 307 F.R.D. 177, 183 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (illustrating court acting as neutral party).
207 Milos Kitchen, 307 F.R.D at 183. InMilo 's Kitchen, the Court conducted in camera review
when a requesting party contested a producing party's redaction of alleged privileged infornation
because it was "suspect." Id.
208 See supraPart V, Section A (stating initial in camera review should prevent discoverability
and privilege disputes); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining courts are
neutral parties that can settle discovery issues).
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the burden to a special master in these cases because special
masters usually
209
do not have the skill or authority to resolve the issue.
E. The Case of an UnavailableAccount
In agreement with courts, a third party social media host should
never have to review content for a case to which it is not a litigant. 210
Therefore, where a producing party does not have access to an account, a
party to the litigation should subpoena the host for the account's content, and
then, the content would go through the same burden shifting balancing test
outlined above .211
F. Illustratingthe ProposedBurden-Shifting Balancing Test Using
Honeybaked Ham Co.
Recall that in E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., 212 the
court appointed a special master because it was concerned about privacy and
was not convinced about all "alleged areas of relevant information" the
defendant claimed, even though the defendant made a requisite showing of
relevance for some of the information.2 13 There were no credibility issues
regarding the producing party; rather, the court was skeptical about the
requesting party's requests even after a showing of relevance as to some
content. 2 14 As such, under the proposed burden-shifting balancing test, the
court would have likely conducted a minimal in camera review for its own
confidence, and then, if it was unsure about a particular portion, the court
could still direct the producing party to review that particular portion
thoroughly.2 15 In doing so, the court would be able to make sure that the
216
defendant is not fishing, and would be able to save costs for litigants.
209

See E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL

5430974, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (noting special master appointed by court was a forensic

expert).
210 See Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 117
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (expressing reluctance to obligate third party social hosts to review social media
accounts for discovery).
211 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining social host may need to participate
if producing party has access to account).
212 2012 WL 5430974, at *2.
213 See id. at *3 (expressing doubt as to defendant-requesting party's discovery requests).
214 See id. at *2.
215 See supra Part V, Section A (stating courts can order producing party to review particular
areas thoroughly during in camera process).
216 See supra Part V, Section A (explaining this proposition).
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Hiring a special master would be more costly and time consuming than the
court performing a minimal in camera review, and then the producing party
bearing the burden of thorough review of the court's selected portion.217
Hence, under the proposed rule, in HoneybakedHam Co., the burden would
have ended up on the producing party and there would be no need for
outsourcing. 218 Recall that in Honeybaked Ham Co. the court hired a special
master to examine whether all of the defendant's requested areas were
relevant.2 19 Under the proposed approach, applying a minimal in camera
review, the court would have already pre-screened this question, and there
would be no need for a special master.22 °
As shown, using the proposed approach, the analysis does not have
to become lengthy or complicated unless credibility becomes at issue or the
producing party claims privilege. 221 In most cases, therefore, a court will
simply conduct a minimal review and the producing party will bear the
burden.222 This result only slightly departs from the traditional approach of
having the producing party bear the burden.223
VI. IMPROVEMENTS TO BURDEN REDUCTION
As previously stated, there are tools within the Fed. R. Civ. P. that a
producing party can use to reduce his or her burden of production.224 As
such, there are only a few burden
reduction points to add to the methods that
22 5
use.
in
or
place
in
are already
First, where a court must perform a thorough in camera review
because credibility is at issue, the court can allocate the burden to a special
master and have the producing party bear the cost burden as part of the

217 See HoneybakedHam Co., 2012 WL 5430974, at *2 (stating all contributed to review even
though a special master was appointed.); see Fulcrum Inquiry, supra note 81 (arguing collaborative
efforts between court, litigants, and special master may increase costs and reduce efficiency).
218 See supra Part V, Sections A-B (deeming special masters unnecessary when no credibility
or contests to discoverability or privilege exist).
219 See HoneybakedHam Co., 2012 WL 5430974, at *2-3.
220 See Supra Part V, Sections A-B.
221 See supra Part V, Section A (demonstrating how Honeybaked Ham Co. would result under
proposed approach).
222 See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text (Under the proposed approach, without
credibility issues as to a producing party, a court would have conducted minimal review placing
the burden of any additional review on producing party.).
223 See cases cited supra note 46 (showing that majority of courts place burden of review on
producing party).
224 See supra Part IV.
225 See supra Part IV (listing and explaining burden-reducing methods).
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producing party's sanctions for his or her dishonesty.226 On the other hand,
where a court must perform a thorough review because the producing party
contests discoverability or privilege, the court may elect a special master and
have the producing party bear the costs if the contest was obviously
unwarranted.227 Second, whether collaborative effort between a special
master, the litigants, and the court is efficient is debatable because the
purpose of appointing a special master is to reduce costs and save the courts
228
time; a collaborative effort would be counter-productive and inefficient.
Lastly, because courts and litigants are still shying away from
predictive coding, Congress should amend the Fed. R. Civ. P. to reflect the
effectiveness and acceptance of predictive coding, and should include a list
of encouraged appropriate uses. 229 The amendment should reflect the

following draft or a similar version:
Predictive coding or technology-assisted review ("TAR") is

an effective way to reduce the burden of review, especially
in cases where an overwhelming amount of content is
involved. The use of this technology is not required, but
highly recommended. The technology is acceptable and in
line with the policies of the Fed. R. Civ. P. that promote
efficiency and cost reduction. Litigants should especially
consider predictive coding in complex, large data volume
cases.

230

226 See generally FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (granting court authority to shift cost burden);
see also E.E.O.C v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-CV-02560 MSK MEH, 2012 WL
5430974, at *2-3 (explaining special masters' purpose).
227 See id (outlining limitations on ESI).
228 See Fulcrum Inquiry, supra note 81 (noting special master can perform review
inexpensively and more timely than courts with filled dockets).
229 See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Computerassisted review is an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI [electronically stored information]
in appropriate cases."); see also Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125 at 127 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) ("In the three years since Da Silva Moore, the case law has developed to the point that it is
now black letter law that where the producing party wants to utilize TAR [technology assisted
review] for document review, courts will permit it.").
230 See Da Silva Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 189 ("Computer-assisted review is an acceptable way
to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases."). In Da Silva Moore, the court also said,
"[C]omputer-assisted review is an available tool and should be seriously considered for use in largedata-volume cases where it may save the producing party (or both parties) significant amounts of
legal fees in document review." Id. at 193. See Rio, 306 F.R.D. at 127; see also supra Part III
(outlining Congress's efforts to improve efficiency in discovery of ESI); supra Part V, Section B
(describing predictive coding and its uses);
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VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed burden-shifting test outlined in this note departs only
slightly from tradition, as the plaintiff would still bear the burden in most
cases. The test, however, takes into consideration other factors such as
conduct, which the traditional approach fails to address adequately. Though
minimal in camera review would take less time than a thorough review,
adding the step of a minimal in camerareview would still be time-consuming
for courts. The impact of a minimal in camera review, however, would make
the time spent worthwhile. In the end, the producing party will be the one
with most of the burden-like the traditional approach-but the initial
screening process via minimal in camera review would protect the court's
interest of not having to deal with many discoverability and privilege
disputes, and would more greatly protect the integrity of the discovery
process. "Relevance is in the eye of the beholder," and a court's eyes are the
best pair to review social media content for relevance in the first instance,
even if the court only takes a quick glance.
23 1
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